Secure orchestration is an important concern in the internet of service. Next to providing the required functionality the composite services must also provide a reasonable level of security in order to protect sensitive data. Thus, the orchestrator has a need to check whether the complex service is able to satisfy certain properties. Some properties are expressed with metrics for precise definition of requirements. Thus, the problem is to analyse the values of metrics for a complex business process.
Introduction
Orchestration of complex web services is a multidimensional problem. Various criteria must be considered when different alternatives exist. Typically, one of such criteria is security. Recently, the security issues of service composition are receiving major attention [20, 22, 4, 7, 21, 9] . Among them, formal methods have been successfully applied for modelling and analysing several different aspects of service security. In practice, these techniques generate a formal abstraction of the services under analysis. Then, a verification procedure is applied to find a formal proof of compliance between the model and the security specifications.
The first difficulty arises from service abstraction. Indeed, it is crucial that services are modelled in a "safe" way, i.e., without neglecting any security-relevant behaviour they can generate. The problem is that this feature is not always guaranteed as specification and implementation is often developed independently.
Although several, effective algorithms for software verification exist, e.g., model checking [11] , they often require some modification to be applied to web services. Indeed, the algorithms typically check the compliance between a specification and a model and, if the check fails, they return a description of the detected error, e.g., a behaviour of the model that violates the specification. However, web services are designed and developed separately and they commonly have different and independent security requirements. Moreover, they are oriented to the composition and they can produce many different models, i.e., one for each possible orchestration. Hence, the verification process cannot just focus on an illegal orchestration, but should help in finding valid ones.
Service usages are often based on security metrics. Metrics conveniently use mathematical values to represent some "qualities" of a service. Several authors, e.g., see [23, 18] , proposed mathematical models for the definition and composition of security metrics.
In this paper we propose an extension of previous work (see [12, 13] ) on secure service orchestration integrating facilities for composing and verifying security metrics. In particular, we start from the service model proposed by Bartoletti et al. [4] . Roughly, they propose a type and effect system for producing safe abstractions of the behaviour of web services. Then, the authors verify these abstractions against the security policies, locally specified by each service, to find a valid composition. We extend their model by introducing metric checks and metric annotations on their abstractions. We use a mathematical structure, called c-semiring, in order to generalise our model and be independent from the metrics used for the analysis, but still be able to reason on these metrics. Metric annotations are obtained through a new, improved type and effect system. In this way, we generate metric-annotated abstractions which contain both security and metric requirements. All the requirements are applied to different portions of the service orchestration through a local scope.
The main advantage of this approach is the possibility to model and compose both security and metric requirements in a single framework. Service developers apply security policies and metric checks to some parts of their services. Our type and effect system extracts history expressions from the implementation of the services. History expressions safely denote the behaviour of service invocations. Within a history expression, the type and effect system adds extra annotations for metrics, metric checks and security framings. Then, we adopt the same verification procedure described in [4] with special pre-processing steps for assigning correct metric labels to each service. The final result is a complete framework for defining, modelling, verifying, and enforcing both security and metric requirements in order to find valid service orchestrations.
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the working example we will develop during our presentation. In Section 3 we describe our extension of the programming language λ req and we define its operational semantics. Then, Section 4 presents our type and effect system and Section 5 describes the analysis of security and metric requirements. Finally, Section 7 concludes the paper.
Running example
The travel agency BestTravel offers a travel planning service to its customers. BestTravel exploits existing services for implementing the complex task of (i) booking a connection (consisting of one or more flights) to the destination, (ii) booking a hotel room, (iii) paying the acquired items (i.e., flights and hotel room), and (iv) providing the customer with a signed receipt. As usual in service-oriented architectures, the four subtask described above are provided by existing web services.
The service developer starts from an abstract workflow describing the behaviour of BestTravel and produces a corresponding implementation. The abstract workflow depicts the atomic operations that the service must implement and how they compose each other. In the case of BestTravel, most of the atomic operations are invocations to other services. Figure 1 shows the abstract workflow of BestTravel. Reading Figure 1 (from left to right), we can understand the service behaviour. In words, a session of BestTravel works as follows. The service runs two procedures in parallel (rooted in ). The first one (upper 
where f v is the standard function returning the set of free variables of an expression e. Table 1 : Syntax of λ req and abbreviations path of the workflow) is responsible for booking a flight connection for the travel destination. In practice, BestTravel invokes a service looking for a direct flight, i.e., search direct flight. Then the execution can take two alternative branches ( node): it can invoke a payment service for booking the flight, i.e., book flight, or it can start a new research for a multiple-flight connection, namely an itinerary, and book it, i.e., search itinerary and book itinerary. Concurrently, the second process (lower path) invokes services for searching and booking a hotel, i.e., search hotel and book hotel. When the two parallel procedures terminate, BestTravel iteratively invokes a digital signature service, i.e., sign line, for applying integrity and authenticity tokens to the hotel receipt and terminates. A requirement of BestTravel is to have risk level of the performed tasks (in particular, flight booking, hotel reservation and receipt signature) less than 75. Therefore, two problems must be solved: (i) statically estimate risk for the composition plans; (2) in case some execution path in the composition plan fails the requirement, dynamically check the risk of selected paths and prevent the failure of the requirement if a risky path is selected.
Service structure
In this section we present an extended version of λ -calculus, called λ req [4] . First, we extend our previous work with two main novelties: parallel composition and metric facilities. Parallel agents in this work are defined without modifying the original syntax of the calculus. We obtain it by re-defining the operational semantics of λ req . Second, we incorporate metrics into our formalism using special operations for denoting metric annotations and metric constraints. These operators are interpreted in a c-semiring mathematical structure. Metric facilities allow us to model metrics which are used in service composition.
Syntax
First, we define the syntax of expressions e, e as shown in Table 1 . Briefly, * is the closed, side effectsfree expression, r, r ∈ R denotes system resources and x, y are variables. Access events α(e), β (e ) represent the access to a certain resource, resulting from the evaluation of the event argument, through a specific operation/channel (e.g., α and β ). Conditional term if b then e else e represents a branch between two expressions (where b is a boolean guard). A function is defined through the term λ z x.e, where e is the function body in which x is the formal parameter and z denotes the function itself (for recursive invocations). Instead, the term e e denotes the application of a function e to a parameter e . We feel free to use parenthesis for grouping either a function or its argument in order to improve readability. Security framing is used to apply the scope of a security policy ϕ to a term. We also use metric framing for expressing a term laying in the scope of a metric constraint γ. Finally, a service request req ρ τ − → τ denotes the invocation of a service having a certain functional interface, i.e., τ − → τ shows that the function requires a type τ as input and produces type τ as output, and is labelled with a unique identifier ρ. Although, it is hard to create the λ req representation for non experts such the model may be created automatically, similar to transformation of Java code [3] . For the sake of presentation, we introduce some useful abbreviations (see Table 1 ). Moreover, to improve the readability we feel free to use simple expressions for conditional guards, e.g., is available or is empty, which have a straightforward interpretation in the context we use them. We also use upper cases for resources, e.g., HOTEL and FLIGHT, and lower cases for actions, e.g., book(. . .) and buy(. . .).
According to the standard λ req theory, we define security policies through usage automata [2] . Usage automata resemble non deterministic finite state automata (NFA) defined over the alphabet of access events. A sequence of actions is compliant with a certain policy if its corresponding usage automata does not reach a final, offending state reading the trace, i.e., valid traces are those rejected by the automata (see [2] for details).
Our main focus in this section is on the definition of metric constraints. Indeed, we introduce a syntax for defining metric checks which then we apply through metric framing. In particular a metric check has the form γ = T ≥ T d where T is a metric name, ≥ T is its order relation and d is an element of T . Here we slightly abuse our notation for the sake of simplicity, in order to show that the metric computed for a business process must be better than some predefined value (i.e., threshold). In practice, a metric check is satisfied by a value
Example 1. We continue our running example. We assume the (sets of) resources: I = {ITINERARY}, F = {FLIGHT No, NO FLIGHT}, H = {HOTEL RESV}, B = I ∪F ∪H and D = {RCPT, SIGNED DOC}. In Figure 2 we propose the λ req implementation of the services informally introduced in Section 2.
Intuitively, service 1 receives an input airport x and searches a direct flight (action search flight for). Then, depending on the is available boolean flag, the service either reserves a seat (reserve) and returns the flight number FLIGHT No, or returns the NO FLIGHT value. Service 2 works similarly. The main difference is that, if the flight is not available, it checks whether it is possible to make an overbooking reservation (can overbook flag) and proceeds with the reservation (overbook) before returning the flight number or the NO FLIGHT value. Instead, service 3 finds a sequence of flights for the destination, namely an itinerary (generate travel to). Then the itinerary is reserved (reserve), a travel insurance is stipulated (insurance) and the itinerary is returned. Service 4 resembles 3, but no insurance is activated. Hotel booking services, i.e., services 5 and 6, receive a destination city x and book an hotel (action book) before returning the hotel reservation HOTEL RESV. The main difference between the two services is that service 5 looks for a 3 stars hotel (action find hotel 3s) while service 6, after discriminating on the flag high season, searches either a 2 stars or a 4 stars hotel (actions find hotel 2s and find hotel 4s, respectively). Payment services 7 and 8 receive an item identifier x and return an electronic receipt RCPT after performing a purchase operation (action buy). However, while 8 charges the operation with a constant, extra amount (action const charge), service
Figure 3: Implementation of BestTravel.
7 applies either no commission charge or a variable amount (action var charge). Finally, signing services accept a document x and return a signed version of it SIGNED DOC. The only difference between them is that 9 uses a 64 bit key for the signing process (action sign 64) while 10 uses a 128 bit ones (sign 128).
Note, that with several alternative services which provide the same functionality we have several different possible execution paths which have different security properties.
Example 2. We assume the existence of the resources: A = {AIRPORT} and C = {CITY}. In Figure 3 we propose a λ req implementation of the workflow of the BestTravel service, called e B .
In words, e B carries out three tasks: it concurrently runs (i) a hotel booking process (line 4) and (ii) a flight booking one (lines 5-6) and, then, (iii) executes a signature procedure (line 2). The first process consists of an invocation to a hotel search service using the resource CITY. The result is then passed as input for (an invocation to) a payment service. Similarly, the second process requests a itinerary searching service using the resource AIRPORT. Then, according the evaluation of the guard no direct flight, the service either starts a new request to flight searching service and proceeds with the payment or just invokes a payment service. The final result of this concurrent execution is the document returned by the first process. This value is then used as the actual parameter of the last operation of the service. It consists of a recursive function which, depending on the guard is empty, can either return the resource SIGNED DOC or invoke a signing service and loop.
All the three tasks are subject to a metric requirement γ = Risk ≤ 75, i.e., each of them must be executed under a risk factor lower than 75 ($).
C-Semirings
Our framework exploits the notion of c-semiring for the abstraction of metrics and operators over metrics [6] . Usage of this mathematical structure allow us to provide a generic framework for all metrics which could be considered as c-semirings. A c-semiring consists of a set of values D (e.g., natural or real numbers), and two types of operators: multiplication (⊗) and summation (⊕) of values and constraints. Formally, a c-semiring is defined as follows (see the work of S. Bistarelli et. al., for more details [6] ). • ⊕, being an addition defined over D, is a binary, commutative (i.e.,
• ⊗, being a multiplication over D, is a binary, commutative and associative operator such that 1 is its unit element and 0 is its absorbing element (i.e.,
In this work we focus on a special subset of c-semirings:
Definition 2. c * -semiring is a c-semiring with ⊕ satisfying the following condition: 
In this work we need a reverse operation for summation ⊕ −1 which is defined as follows.
In words, this operation always returns the worst possible value. Property 1. Operation ⊕ −1 is associative, commutative, idempotent, distributive over ⊗, and monotone 1 .
Example 3. Regarding to the security targets BestTravel is going to use two metrics: trust and risk. Trust is often computed as a probability that the requested service is going to behave as agreed. Thus, trust could be seen as a value between 0 and 1, which is aggregated by multiplying and the higher value is considered better than a lower one. C * -semiring for trust value formally is defined as follows: [0, 1], max, ×, 0, 1 . This type of c-semirings is known as possibilistic semiring.
Risk, considered as possible losses, has the domain of positive real numbers. Multiplication of risks is summation of possible losses, when the lower value is, naturally, considered more preferable than the higher one. Therefore, c * -semiring for risk could be seen as N + ∪ {∞}, min, +, ∞, 0 , known as tropical semiring.
Operational Semantics
Service execution is driven by the operational semantics defined in Table 2 . Intuitively, a computation step consists of a reduction from a source configuration to a target one. Configurations are tuples η, d, e where η is an execution trace, i.e., the sequence of events performed so far (ε denotes the empty execution trace); d is the current metric value; and e is a λ req term, which describes the part of the service under evaluation. The operational semantics is driven by a composition plan π which is responsible for providing a mapping between each service request and an actual service, in symbols π(ρ) = where ρ and are request and service identifiers, respectively. In the following we also use → * π for the transitive closure of → π . Below, we provide an informal explanation of the operational semantics rules. To be performed, an action α requires its argument e to be evaluated first (rule (S−Ev 1 )). If the action target reduces to a resource r, the action takes place and the current history η is extended with the corresponding event α(r) (rule (S−Ev 2 )). Also, the current metric is updated with the metric value for the event α(r). F is a metric and context-dependent predefined function which assigns a metric value to every event. In practice, function F can be found analytically (e.g., risk=probability×impact), derived form past experience, i.e., using monitoring or assigned by experts (e.g., number of successful virus attacks). A conditional expression is reduced to one of its branches (i.e., e tt and e ff 2 ) depending on the value of its guard b (rule (S−If)). Here we assume an evaluation function B, assigning to each possible guard a boolean value, is to be defined. Rules (S−App 1 ), (S−App 2 ) and (S−App 3 ) define the behaviour of function application. Briefly, a function e and its argument e are both reduced to values, i.e., terms that admit no further reduction. The steps of the two reductions are executed in a non deterministic way, without any fixed priority between the choice of (S−App 1 ) and (S−App 2 ). When both computations generate a value, i.e., a lambda abstraction and its argument, the application reduces to the body of the function where the formal parameter x is replaced by the actual value v and the variable z is substituted with the function itself (rule (S−App 3 )). Note that, along the paper, we use v, v to denote values, i.e., closed, effect-free terms being either * , resources, λ -abstractions or service requests. Rules (S−Sec 1 ) and (S−Sec 2 ) define the behaviour of the security framing. Basically, a security framing behaves as its target unless it tries to extend the current history η to an illegal trace. When the target expression reduces to a value, the policy framing can be removed, i.e., the corresponding security check is deactivated, if the current history is a legal one. Similarly, (S−Met 1 ) and (S−Met 2 ) rule metric checks. In words, a metric check forces metric values generated during the execution of a term e to comply with a constraint γ. Finally, service requests (rule (S−Req)) works by running the service e with actual parameter v. Among all the compatible services, i.e., those having the same behavioural interface specified by the request ρ, appearing in the service repository Srv 3 , one is selected according to the current composition plan π. Note that the interface of actual services is also annotated with a history expression H which represent the service contract (see Section 4 for more details on this point).
Example 4. Let e 1 be the implementation of service 1 proposed in Example 1. We assume B(is available) = tt, and consider the semiring Risk introduced in Example 3 and the function F Risk which returns the values shown in Table 3 (where missing entry evaluate to 0 and · stands for any compatible value). Then, we have the following computation for = ε, 0, (e 1 )AIRPORT (where AIRPORT is a resource in A ). In words, the computation proceeds as follows. The first step consists in applying the rule (S−App 3 ) which, in practice, replaces all the occurrences of x with AIRPORT. The second reduction collapses two rules, i.e., (S−Ev 2 ) and (S−App 3 ). As a result of the rule (S−Ev 2 ) a new event, that is search flight for(AIRPORT), is added to the execution trace ε. Also, according to the given definition of F Risk , the current metric is updated. Recalling the c * -semiring specified in Example 3, we note that the multiplication operation over risk values is the sum, then 0 ⊗ 0 = 0 + 0 = 0. The subsequent step evaluates the conditional guard is available and chooses the "then" branch (rule (S−If)). Finally, the last piece of computation repeats the operations described above and updates the current configuration by both adding a new event to the execution history and changing the current metric value (i.e., 0 ⊗ 15 = 0 + 15 = 15). Since the term appearing in the last configuration is a value, i.e., the resource FLIGHT No, the computation terminates.
Type and effect system
In this section we present our proposal for a type and effect system. It derives from the type and effect system presented in [4] from which it inherits most of its rules.
History expressions
Briefly, a type and effect system carries out the extraction of behavioural description from a certain expression while typing it. We use history expressions for representing the behaviour of a program in terms of the execution histories it can generate at runtime.
The main novelties introduced by our type and effect system are (i) parallel composition and (ii) metric annotation. Parallel composition denotes two elements which can run concurrently, in an interleaving fashion. Instead, metric annotation associate a metric value to a certain behaviour. Table 4 reports the syntax of history expressions.
A history expression can be the empty one ε, a variable h or an access event α(r).
Valid history expressions are also concatenations (H · H ), unions (H + H ), parallel compositions (H | H ), metric-annotated expressions (d#H), security framings (ϕ[H]), metric checks (γ H ) and least fix-point, recursive expressions (µh.H).
A history expression denotes a set of execution traces. We use a denotational semantics to bind each history expression to the corresponding set of traces. The semantic function · · is defined in Table 5 . Note that we use the environment δ for mapping variables to set of traces.
A ε expression denotes the singleton containing the empty trace (we use ε for both void history expressions and empty traces as they are clearly identified by the context). The semantics of a variable h corresponds to the set of histories associated to it in δ . A history expression α(r) denotes the singleton {α(r)}. The semantics of a sequence H · H is the set of traces ηη such that η ∈ H δ and η ∈ H δ . Similarly, the semantics of a choice is the union between the sets denoted by the two sub-expressions. Parallel history expressions H | H denote the set of all the possible interleaving of traces belonging to the two sub-expressions. Interleaving semantics is defined through the binary operator · · . Intuitively, if one of the two considered histories is ε, the operator · · returns the other one. Instead, for non-empty traces it generates all the possible sequences representing concurrent executions. This process is obtained by considering all the possible prefixes of one trace, adding the first action of the other trace and recursively applying the · · operator to the remaining "tails". In the style of [5] , security framing denotes execution histories wrapped between two special actions [ ϕ and ] ϕ (for brevity, we write ϕ[X] in place of [ ϕ ·X·] ϕ ). These special actions mark the activation and deactivation points of a policy. Following a similar reasoning, the semantics of γ H is the set of traces denoted by H wrapped by the special
where the binary function · · is recursively defined as follows.
( 
Typing relation
In the following we introduce our typing rules. The main difference with respect to the rules proposed in previous works is that here we generate metric annotated history expressions during the typing process. Before presenting the typing rules, we need to introduce types and type environments. A type can be both a simple type, i.e., unit or the resource domain R 4 , or a function from type τ to type τ . Functional types also carry a history expression H which represents the latent effect of invoking the function. Then, a type environment Γ, being either the empty one / 0 or the one obtained through a new binding Γ; x : τ, is a mapping from variables to types.
The typing relation has the form Γ, H e : τ. It must be read as "under the environment Γ and carrying the effect H, expression e has type τ". The rules in Table 6 define the typing relation.
Briefly, the expression * has unit type and generates no side effects (H = ε, rule (T−Unit)) while a resource r, being also side effect free, has type R (rule (T−Res)). The type of a variable x depends on the typing context provided by Γ (rule (T−Var)). Abstractions (rule (T−Abs)) has an empty effect and produce a functional type τ H − → τ from their input to their output types. The latent effect H is the one obtained from typing the function body. Rule (T−Ev) requires more attention. Indeed, we say that an expression α(e), having type unit, generates a history expression which is the sequence between the history expression deriving from typing its argument e and the summation (i.e., a finite sequence of choice operators) of all the possible access actions α to a compatible resource r ∈ R. Also, all of these access events are annotated with the metric value provided by the function F. The application of a function e to an argument e , i.e., rule (T−App), has type equal to the return type of e and a history effect which is the sequence between (1) the two effects of e and e in parallel and (2) the latent effect of the function. Security and metric framing (rules (T−Frm) and (T−Met)) have the same Table 6 : Typing relation type as their targets and produce wrapped history expressions. Rule (T−Wkn) says that we can always type an expression under a more general history expression. Finally, rule (T−Req) says that a service request has the same type of its signature but for its latent effect which is obtained as the disjunction of all the (latent effects of the) possible servers appearing in the repository Srv. Example 5. Consider service 9, we call its implementation e 9 , of Example 1. Writing it without abbreviations we obtain: e 9 = λ z x.(λ w y.SIGNED DOC)sign 64(x). Then consider the function F Risk of Table 3 . We type e 9 as follows. Following a similar reasoning we type all the services of example 1 as shown in Figure 4 . For brevity, in the following we use H i to denote the latent effect of service e i . Example 6. Using the notation introduced in the previous examples for denoting the history expressions of services, we type the BestTravel implementation e B as in Figure 5 . We call H B the latent effect labelling the arrow type of e B .
The main result on the type and effect system is type safety. In words, type safety guarantees that effects produced by the type and effect system safely denote the behaviour of services. Theorem 1. If Γ, H e : τ and ε, d, e → * π η, d , v then ∀δ .η ∈ H δ . Interestingly, the extensions presented in this paper do not invalidate this result originally proved by Bartoletti et. al. [4] . In the next section, we show that history expressions safety is also preserved under metric factorization.
5 Security and metric analysis
History expressions and semirings
Metric annotations are used to label a history expression with metric values which are expected to be produced dynamically. However, metric annotations are locally associated with parts of a history expression while, in general, it would be preferable to have a single value labelling the whole expression. In particular, we are interested in a procedure which turns a history expression into a corresponding normal form. Definition 6. A history expression H is said to be in metric normal form (MNF), iff H = d#H and H contains no metric annotations.
In Table 7 we propose a set of equivalences that we use to move and compose metric annotations appearing in history expressions. The rules in Table 7 define the correspondence between the history expressions and the semiring operators. In particular, we can always add a multiplication-neutral annotation to a history expression, nested annotations are commutative and can be reduced to a semiring multiplication and choice correspond to the inverse of a semiring addition, namely a subtraction. Also parallel composition can be annotated with the (result of the) multiplication between the two subexpressions annotations. A security framing is orthogonal to metric annotation, i.e., they do not affect each other. Instead, metric checks have a precise effect on annotations. As a matter of fact, we can remove a metric check by forcing its target to be annotated with the difference (⊕ −1 ) between the inner annotation and the threshold of γ. Finally, a recursion is annotated with the least fix point of the function Φ that extracts the metric annotation from the inner history expression after annotating the bounded variable h.
A crucial property we want to prove on the equation rules of Table 7 is that they do not invalidate the semantics of history expressions. Such property guarantees that history expression transformations do not affect the safety property stated by theorem 1. 
Property 2. For all history expressions H and H
Note, that the right side of the previous equivalence is in MNF. According to the operations of the semiring Risk , the resulting annotation value is 15.
Many authors proposed formal languages for specifying and verifying agreements, also called contracts, between a service provider and a customer. Padovani [21] proposes a language for defining service contracts and presents a theory for the automatic generation of service orchestrators. Subcontract relations are used to find a matching between the contract offered by a service and the requirements of its clients. Similarly, Bravetti and Zavattaro [8] present a language for the specification of service contracts. Their contracts have a process algebra-based semantics and allow for the specification of composed services. Contract composition can be verified to guarantee that the interaction of a group of services does not violate the specifications. Even though these works do not focus on security analysis, their contracts can be adapted to model security requirements.
Martinelli and Matteucci [17] presented a framework for the synthesis of a secure orchestrator, i.e., an agent which drives the interaction between two services guaranteeing that a certain security policy is respected. Although, the proposals described above use contracts for the specification and analysis of history-based [1] service properties, none of them allows for the definition of security metrics and restrictions on them.
In order to check whether a complex business process satisfies some quantitative requirements aggregation of security metric values for atomic services is required. For example, Cheng et. al. [10] aggregated downtime metric, considering business process like a simple set of activities, i.e., regardless the operational flow.
In contrast, Jaeger et. al. [19] have shown that some metrics could be aggregated differently depending on the structural activity used for joining the atomic services. In this work all metrics were considered separately. Moreover, the author did not considered security metrics. Yu et. al. [24, 23] applied the idea of Jeager at. al. for selection of the best process among several alternatives. The authors defined aggregation functions for several metrics and aimed at selection of the best alternative which satisfies the constraints specified in the agreement. First the authors defined a utility function and proposed to solve a 0-1 multi-dimension multi-choice knapsack problem (MMKP) only for a sequential order [23] . Solutions for a general workflow were proposed later [24] .
Massacci and Yautsiukhin [18] proposed a method and an algorithm for aggregation of security metrics. The authors also solved the problem of selection the best (i.e., more secure) alternative, though a wider range of metrics were considered (these metrics cannot be used in classical algorithms for finding the shortest path). The method was extended for checking several metrics at the same time using Pareto optimality strategy [14] .
In our work we do not have a goal to select the business process which has the best metric value. Moreover, we assume that some processes which do have a value worse than desired may still satisfy the policy if a more secure execution path is selected for a specific invocation. Therefore, our proposal allows making a decision at design time and supporting control at run-time.
Conclusion
In this paper we presented a novel approach for dealing with the analysis and verification of both security and metric requirements of web services. Our system is developed on existing solutions for modelling security and metric-based requirements. The result is a unified framework for (i) the definition and application of security and metric policies within service implementation, (ii) the automatic extraction of history expressions carrying metric annotations and (iii) the computation (through an equational theory) of metric values which safely predict the expected behaviour of services. Our proposal requested a new type and effect system, extending existing approaches, to be defined. Interestingly, we found that adding metric annotations does not invalidate the type safety property, i.e., annotations are orthogonal to the history expressions.
The present work is a first step toward a complete model for the specification and verification of quantitative and qualitative, non functional requirements for web services. Further effort is requested in order to generalise our approach. In particular, we aim at defining a procedure for generating orchestration plans starting from the history expressions produced by our type and effect system. Such method has been presented in [4] for metricfree history expressions and we believe that similar results can be extended to our proposal. Another limitation of the current model is our static description of metric value for the events. Even though we think that assigning metric values to events is a reasonable way to model the actual behaviour of services, it is not always correct to assume these values to keep unchanged in time. Indeed, many metrics aim at modelling dynamic evolution of some property, e.g., reputation or number of system failures, which we cannot model with our approach.
